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Abstract 
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Small Island Developing States (SIDS) have become protagonists in the global movement to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions by calling upon their extreme environmental vulnerability to situate 
themselves as leaders in the fight against climate change. At international climate conventions, SIDS 
have captured the imagination of the public worldwide by demonstrating the real impacts of climate 
change in an accelerated timeframe. The prevailing wisdom dictates that SIDS are non-competitive in 
entrepreneurship, yet these small nations have become global leaders in both mitigating their 
contributions to greenhouse gas emissions and adapting to the effects of climate change. By engaging 
in policy innovation, many islands have been able to turn their constraints to their advantage to situate 
themselves as global leaders in knowledge production for climate change adaptation. Yet, how might 
innovation be characterized in the context of climate change? This study approaches this question 
using the case of the Pacific island territory of Tokelau, which has a population of less than 1,500, and 
yet became a global leader in climate debates by generating almost all of its electricity with solar 
photovoltaic panels. As an extremely isolated and recently depopulated territory, Tokelau had major 
constraints to developing such a project. This study identifies creative indigenous thinking and 
engagement with its political status as a sub-national island jurisdiction (SNIJ) of New Zealand as 
island innovations that enabled Tokelau at once to enact the groundbreaking Tokelau Renewable 
Energy Project and couple it with a move towards moral leadership in global climate politics. These 
finding reveals that SNIJs and SIDS can turn their perceived disadvantages as small and isolate states 
into engines of innovation that create a significant impact within and well beyond their own shores. 
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Chapter 1: Islands in a changing climate 
 
“On an island, you are disconnected, with water all around you. On an island, you are alone, even if you share the 
place with others. The location is by definition eccentric, because it acknowledges a centre elsewhere” 
- Islands: A Trip Through Time and Space (Conrad, 2009) 
 
Climate change is one of the most complex political-ecological processes in history. It unites and 
divides peoples across continents, and is experienced in varying degrees, often according to global 
power dynamics. From Beijing to Suva and Paris to Funafuti, grassroots political movements on 
climate change have brought people together to find solutions to an intricate socio-environmental 
crisis. This global movement has shown that environmental issues can connect even the most isolated 
of regions to global political discourse.  
 
In this thesis, I turn attention to the ways that Small Island Developing States (SIDS) have become 
heroes of the climate movement at United Nations (UN) conferences through the innovative 
management and planning of public relations, bringing attention to the impacts of climate change. 
The Maldives gained global press coverage when the President and his entire cabinet scuba-dived to 
hold a meeting underwater to demonstrate the risk posed to the country by sea-level rise (Ramesh, 
2009). Additionally, the President of Kiribati was lauded for announcing the purchase of land in Fiji 
to relocate his entire population to in the event of national inundation (Caramel, 2014). Through acts 
like these, SIDS have captured the popular imagination about climate change, drawing attention to 
their own plight as highly threatened but fighting for their survival and to the global processes outside 
of their jurisdictions that have created their problems. 
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The distinctive physical constraints of islands make them particularly vulnerable to climate change. 
Their small size, remoteness and economic vulnerability means the impacts are often accelerated and 
magnified and so felt much more acutely than in mainland areas (Connell, 2013). Atolls in particular 
are vulnerable due to their low-lying nature and dense populations. These islands are created as extinct 
volcanic craters subside beneath the water, permitting a coral platform to grow upwards and form 
reefs. This leaves thin strips of land broken up into islets called motus, which surround large internal 
lagoons. Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, the Maldives, Tuvalu and Tokelau are atoll nations and 
territories that are threatened with the potential climate change impact of sea level rise that stands to 
submerge entire countries (Farbotko, 2015). Nevertheless, all islands tend to have coastal populations, 
and even those that are not at risk of disappearing entirely face severe challenges from their littoral 
orientation. 
 
Opportunities have also arisen from climate change discourse, as SIDS have sought to capitalize on 
the new attention they have gained through their plight. Displays of innovative practices have turned 
the spotlight to these peripheral areas, and many islands have demonstrated that they are eager to excel 
in developing solutions that have global applicability (Barnett & Campbell, 2010). By leading in both 
greenhouse gas mitigation and climate change adaptation, islands can participate economically in a 
system that marginalizes their existence. To do so, they can not only lead sustainable development but 
create a moral high ground from which to call for reductions in greenhouse gas emissions from 
polluting countries. Many of the geographic conditions unique to islands have allowed SIDS to create 
this niche and global environmental politics, and find innovative ways of creating new income streams 
to allow them to compete in the global political-economic system despite their perceived 
disadvantages. 
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1.1 Insularity and heterogeneous island features 
Islands have historically been conceptualized in political and economic geography as marginal entities 
on the fringes of power. In common discourse, the word “insular” is used to describe inward-looking, 
backwards and isolated areas. Traditionally, islands are not viewed as engines of innovation in the 
same way a large city might be (Briguglio, 1995). However, the unique characteristics of islands and 
islanders have given them special capabilities to establish new ways of doing things that in some cases 
enable them to become leaders in their fields, for example in the way many islands have positioned 
themselves and their public policy in the climate change debate. 
 
SIDS are a sub-group of islands that generally have similar characteristics such as low per capita GDP, 
remoteness and vulnerability to environmental shocks. They are found in three main groups in the 
Caribbean Sea, Western Indian Ocean and Southern Pacific Ocean. Despite these common economic 
and geographic features, there is much variation between and within these groupings and the barriers 
they face to development. There is no single definition of SIDS, and the inclusivity of the term can 
vary hugely. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development website (UNCTAD, 2013) 
states that “the UN never established criteria to determine an official list of SIDS”, but maintains a 
website of 29 SIDS on its website for analytic purposes. This is probably one of the more exclusive 
definitions as it is limited to UN members with very specific characteristics.1 
 
The Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) (2015) has a broader definition and includes 39 members. 
Niue and the Cook Islands are not UN members but are classed as independent sovereign nations by 
AOSIS. Larger nations like Cuba, the Dominican Republic and Haiti are also members of AOSIS, but 
often excluded in other fora. It also includes several non-island countries with geographical, cultural 
                                                
1 See Appendix A for a full list of SIDS with notes on different definitions 
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or historical similarities to island nations which embraces Belize, Guyana, Suriname and Guinea-
Bissau. The island nation of Singapore is also an AOSIS member, despite its massive growth in recent 
years to be one of the top five countries in the world by GDP per capita. AOSIS also has several 
observer nations that are sub-national island jurisdictions (SNIJs), incorporating American Samoa, 
Guam, U.S. Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico and the former Netherlands Antilles. The United Nations 
Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing 
Countries and Small Island Developing States (UNOHRLLS, 2016) definition additionally counts 
some British and French SNIJs such as the Cayman Islands, Bermuda and French Polynesia.  
 
Other definitions might include the combined members of the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF),2 the 
Caribbean Community (CARICOM)3 and the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC).4 However, this 
definition would also include some larger countries with dissimilar socio-economic characteristics such 
as Australia, New Zealand and Madagascar, and still fail to include many integral and undisputed SIDS 
such as the Maldives, Cape Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe. It would also neglect to include many 
SNIJs with SIDS characteristics. The relationship between the terms of islands, SNIJs and SIDS is 
represented in Figure 1.5.  
 
SNIJs are sometimes neglected from the definition of SIDS, as the category of islands is often used 
in a UN context which has little consideration of their role. Inclusivity of SNIJs could potentially add 
large numbers to the total number of SIDS due to the many small jurisdictions that remain as entities 
                                                
2 PIF members are Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, 
Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu; associate members are New Caledonia and 
French Polynesia; observers are Guam, Timor-Leste, Tokelau, American Samoa and Wallis and Futuna.  
3 CARICOM members are Antigua & Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, 
Montserrat, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago; 
associate members are Anguilla, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands and Turks and Caicos Islands; observers 
are American Samoa, Guam, Timor-Leste, Tokelau, and Wallis and Futuna.  
4 IOC members are Comoros, France (Réunion), Madagascar, Mauritius and Seychelles. 
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within other nations. The problem becomes defining sovereignty and autonomy, as there are many 
jurisdictional categories of governance. Some islands, such as Palau, the Marshall Islands and the 
Federated States of Micronesia are independent members of the UN but remain in free association 
with the United States under a Compact of Free Association (COFA), from which they receive 
extensive aid, military protection, and rights to migration and work. In issues such as the Israel-
Palestine conflict, these COFA countries are SIDS that have notably been the only other countries to 
vote alongside the US and Israel, while the rest of the world votes against or abstains (Cerone, 2012). 
Tokelau could be defined as a SIDS through its status as an observer of PIF, but is often not counted 
as one because of its constitutional relationship as a dependent territory of New Zealand. However, 
Niue and the Cook Islands are usually counted due to their greater autonomy, and Tokelau’s socio-
economic characteristics are very similar to those of other SIDS nations.  
 
Figure 1.5: Examples of polities falling under the SNIJ and SIDS categories and the possible relationships between them. 
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The Government of Tokelau is also conscious of being part of the SIDS community while lacking the 
full ability to take part at the UN level. At climate summits, Tokelau has strongly self-identified with 
the SIDS group and participated alongside them (Nasau, 2014). Tokelau is an independent member 
of organizations such as the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), Coalition of low lying Atoll Nations on 
Climate Change (CANCC), Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environmental Program (SPREP) and 
Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA), which are entirely or majority made up of other SIDS 
countries. At the 2014 Third International Conference on SIDS in Samoa, the Government of New 
Zealand allowed the head of government, the Ulu o Tokelau, to speak in the single time slot allocated 
to each UN member, affirming the place of Tokelau as a SIDS, but also affirming New Zealand’s 
position of power over Tokelau’s political positionality (Nasau, 2014). 
 
In the Pacific region, the political structure of the islands varies markedly, with most of the population 
living in the twelve fully independent states and the remainder living in the eleven territories or 
associated states with varying degrees of local autonomy. These Pacific SNIJs continue to be 
administered in part by Australia (Norfolk Island), New Zealand (Tokelau, Niue and the Cook 
Islands), France (New Caledonia, Wallis and Futuna and French Polynesia), the United States (Guam, 
American Samoa and the Northern Mariana Islands) and the United Kingdom (the Pitcairn Islands). 
Across the Pacific, SIDS populations range from Niue and Tokelau, each with under 1,500 people, to 
Papua New Guinea with over 7 million. Pacific SIDS are notable in the enduring prominence of 
traditional forms of governance, such as communal land ownership and chiefly titles (Dornan, 2015). 
Within the region there is much cultural diversity between the Polynesian, Melanesian and Micronesian 
regions and the varied groups within them. 
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Many Pacific countries and territories are fragmented and isolated with large populations spread over 
dozens of islands. Kiribati has 100,000 people on 21 atolls spread over 3.5 million square kilometers 
of land. Others SIDS are more condensed onto one or two main islands making transportation easier 
between them. Niue’s small population all live on a single island, whereas Samoa is mostly spread over 
two main islands frequently connected by a short ferry crossing. Fiji is a major transportation hub with 
daily direct transport links to Australia, New Zealand, the United States, Korea and many other Pacific 
islands. Others such as Tuvalu and Kiribati are only accessible via a single weekly flight from Fiji. 
Tokelau and Pitcairn lack airports and are only accessible by occasional boats that may have a journey 
time of several days. Their small size means that in smaller SIDS regardless of sovereignty status, costs 
for administration remain disproportionately high and give rise to bloated public sectors, further seen 
as a disadvantage to development (Connell, 2013). 
 
Discussion about the development of SIDS usually concern their economic viability in the global 
economy, concluding that islands are inherently economically uncompetitive, precluding them from 
achieving sustainable development (Connell, 2013). Private sectors in these areas are seen as 
fundamentally disadvantaged in the global economic system, as they lack the economies of scale to 
host viable businesses (Winters & Martins, 2004). This narrative relies upon the portrayal of isolation 
and lack of agency, with islands consistently posed as the vulnerable group manipulated by outsiders 
for their own benefit.  
 
1.2 Island innovation 
Bucking this conventional wisdom, scholars have recently turned attention to the fact that islands are 
also commonly places of innovation. Having some inherent economic disadvantages, they also have 
important advantages that foster creativity and ingenuity. The limited resources on many islands 
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creates resourceful communities and new ways of thinking that can set examples for the outside world 
to follow (Baldachino, 2015). This is innovation in its broadest sense, from the development of niche 
cottage industries to unique forms of political governance. 
 
Island nations encourage small businesses to thrive and often have fewer people employed by 
multinational companies. This is a trend observed even in larger island nations such as New Zealand. 
Despite its very open liberal economy, New Zealand is still a nation of entrepreneurs (Hamilton & 
Dana, 2003). The small size of the market discourages multinational entry and means islanders must 
be more resourceful, retaining the small nature of their businesses. In the Chatham Islands, an 
archipelago to the East of New Zealand, Dana (2003) found that a single business initiative to set up 
a local airline proved crucial for the other businesses on the islands, illustrating the vulnerability that 
small enterprises on islands may have and the steps they must go to to overcome them. 
 
One form of small-scale entrepreneurship featured in this literature relies on unique traditional 
methods to cope with island conditions. A lack of outside expertise means islanders must find their 
own methods to be resourceful and adapt to the local environment. For example, in Fair Isle, Scotland, 
a unique form of knitting became a mainstay of the economy, to the point where the handicraft was 
named after the island (Butler, 2015). Local women advanced the economy and retained a unique 
aspect of their culture, showing many of the most successful entrepreneurial activities can also be the 
traditional ones and that the originality of island crafts is a key marketing point that can give 
competitive advantage. These internally orientated innovations make use of island characteristics such 
as unique resources and isolation to create a brand, which can be reinforced by their status as a SNIJ.  
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Another form of entrepreneurship relies on the uniqueness of island jurisdictions. SNIJ status 
potentially offers a way to let islanders retain self-governance, while relying on the support of other 
larger and more economically integrated nations. In many cases, this means the islands and the 
islanders occupy a unique political situation that can be exploited for their benefit; but that can also 
make them vulnerable to changing political conditions in their mother country. For example, Jersey is 
a SNIJ in the form of a Crown Dependency of the United Kingdom, but exists outside of both the 
United Kingdom and the European Union. Jersey’s economic success has relied on taking advantage 
of this unique position and making creative legal changes to attract companies and investment 
(Entwistle & Oliver, 2015). The small size of such jurisdictions means they have the agility to move 
quickly before larger countries and carve out a niche to provide services that would not be possible in 
a large country or as an integral polity of a larger country. The nature of many island economies to 
rely on monocultures means they must be nimble to adapt and change to the market. Jersey produces 
a range of services that are interconnected but not interdependent and so can adapt with changing 
financial markets. In the case of American Samoa, designation as a territory has helped to sustain two 
large tuna canneries, the largest private sector employers in the country, for several decades. The 
territorial designation grants the tuna canneries duty free access to the US market as well as access to 
lower cost labor than is available on the US mainland, important competitive advantages that sustained 
the canneries – the largest source of private sector employment in American Samoa – for many 
decades (Campling & Havice, 2007). 
 
Islanders may also develop different attitudes towards risk to mainlanders. In the Maldives, islandness 
helps shape the business and entrepreneurial cultural. Maldivians traditionally base business deals on 
community trust and tradition, and it is rarely seen as necessary to formalize partnerships in business 
deals as the small size of the community means trust is paramount (Dana, 2002). This allows islanders 
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to bypass the need for investment capital, and the lack of this and infrastructure is not seen as a 
constraint. In this way, islanders can use their trust as a form of capital to engage in business. Faith 
and the Islamic economic system also influence business practices, creating a differing situation to 
other islands that is specific to the Maldivian context. The evidence suggests that the small size has an 
impact on the community and in turn this affects entrepreneurship. 
 
The innovation occurring on islands counters the conventional wisdom that they are unproductive 
backwaters with little opportunity for business or potential to shape political processes. The 
geographical situation of islandness itself can promote opportunity and be a driver of entrepreneurship 
and ingenuity. Many islanders have long lived without the wide availability of goods and services 
available to those on mainland areas, and this has created a culture of resourcefulness. In the face of 
large scale environmental issues, this resourcefulness has been repurposed to maximize the benefit for 
islanders to find a place in the global economic system. While a global climate crisis threatens the very 
existence of many SIDS, it has also provided an opportunity to engage with the global economic-
political system. 
 
1.3 Climate change rhetoric 
Island nations, and SIDS in particular, are at the forefront of political action to reduce global 
greenhouse gas emissions and this thesis investigates how island isolation and innovation intersect 
with the dynamics of global climate politics. Sea level rise severely threatens the existence of several 
atoll nations and many areas are now becoming more prone to impacts such as increased flood risk, 
salt-water intrusion and storm surges. There are also long term risks such as reduced food security 
and the arrival of new diseases. Perversely, SIDS are the smallest contributors to global greenhouse 
gas emissions despite bearing the brunt of the impacts. 
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There is a great pessimism for the future of low-lying atolls, that are often framed as doomed to 
disappearing in the mainstream media and whose residents are seen as inevitable refugees (Farbotko, 
2005). Farbotko (2010) argues that atolls are constructed through the lens of ‘wishful sinking’. This 
implies that they represent the ‘canary in the coal mine’, and only become valuable in the eyes of the 
rest of the world on their disappearance due to rising sea levels. In this discourse, the islanders are 
portrayed – or portray themselves - as on the verge of evacuation as the land disappears beneath their 
feet, and no thought is given to the effect of this discourse on their contemporary culture and 
livelihoods. Farbotko argues that atolls represent laboratories that experience accelerated processes of 
climate change in real time for the world to see and show the real implications of greenhouse gas 
emissions, but this is used at the expense of islanders, who are portrayed as passive victims. 
 
This pessimistic discourse of mainstream media neglects the positive impact islanders themselves are 
having on the global stage by raising awareness of the very real threats they face and developing on 
the ground projects to curb greenhouse gas emissions. The SIDS group of countries played a pivotal 
role at COP15 in Copenhagen and COP21 in Paris, helping secure an agreement to curb global 
greenhouse gas emissions (Barritt, 2015). Activists from across the Pacific Islands have also made their 
voice heard through peaceful protest at coal exports in Australia (Clark, 2014). This evidence suggests 
that rather than being passive and marginalized victims of environmental change and stunted global 
politics that enable it to continue, Pacific islanders and their governments achieve and innovate agency 
largely through the climate change debate, enabling them to reach a global audience. 
 
On many islands, climate change has provided a new platform and urgency for innovation. SIDS want 
to prove to the world it is possible to live sustainably, and have been driven to develop new political 
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and practical ways to express this (de Águeda Corneloup & Mol, 2014). Climate change adaptation 
and mitigation have become a platform for SIDS to express their views and provide an alternative 
path. Island governments want to become leaders and take advantage of their unique conditions as 
laboratories of innovation (Greenhough, 2006). Increasing penetration of renewable energy is one way 
that islands show leadership on climate issues.  
 
1.4 Renewable energy as a tool for multi-scalar climate action 
Islands are fortunate to have significant renewable resources at their disposal, in particular solar energy 
in many SIDS. There are strong island-specific motivations driving this innovation in renewables, 
which again run contra to the noncompetitive expectations held for SIDS. The cost of fuel imports is 
some of the highest in the world, due to isolation and diseconomies of scale combined with inefficient 
generation methods (Dornan, 2012). There is a strong political incentive to become global leaders for 
environmental reasons, as islands have formed a niche position in climate change negotiations. 
 
Large volumes of money have been made available through the United Nations Global Environmental 
Facility (UNGEF) in order to help Pacific Island countries meet their requirements under the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (Barnett & Campbell, 2010). 
National energy roadmaps are a tool created by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to help 
island governments meet targets for generation of renewable energy. Dornan (2012) commented that 
PICs have some of the highest targets for renewable energy penetration in the world and questioned 
whether these goals were achievable or made as a political statement to achieve global press. 
 
Projects take a wide variety of forms, but in many SIDS the medium-term goal is 100% of electricity 
generation by renewable sources. There is a strong emphasis on solar energy in the Pacific region, but 
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test projects are being carried out for wind and wave energy. Funders consist of UNDP and bilateral 
donations from a wide variety of countries. In Tuvalu, New Zealand funded an ambitious project to 
provide solar generation for all outer islands, and is currently working on solar for the main atoll of 
Funafuti (NZMFAT, 2015). The small size of Tuvalu has meant the project was mostly funded by a 
single foreign donor, but in larger countries there are various ongoing projects and coordination can 
be complicated. 
 
This thesis focuses on Tokelau, which is acknowledged as the first country in the Pacific to take 
significant steps in its renewable generation ability. In 2012 Tokelau completed a 1MW solar 
installation that provided for over 95% of the nation’s electricity generation needs, and was widely 
acclaimed for this display of environmental leadership. Tokelau is another atoll nation at serious risk 
of climate change, and so has a strong incentive to lead by example and display the potential of 
renewable energy generation. Through creative policy and technological innovation, Tokelau has 
engaged the world to draw attention to the problems faced by SIDS. Tokelau has used this leadership 
to encourage other countries to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and adopt renewable energy as a 
mainstream source of power. As a pioneer in the region, Tokelau’s proof that solar works for Pacific 
SIDS encouraged the installation of solar plants on its island neighbors in a region with previously 
limited experience of renewables. The impact was also felt locally with large savings to the government 
budget with the reduced reliance on expensive fossil fuel imports, showing the interplay of local and 
global pressures that incentivized the construction of the project. 
 
1.5 Objectives and methodology 
The objective of this thesis is to use the case of Tokelau’s renewable project to explore the way that 
islands, and particularly the subcategories of SNIJs and SIDS, have expressed and developed agency 
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collectively by engaging with multiple dimensions of climate change and efforts to address it – a 
climate change motivated form of innovation. It contributes to understanding the role of renewable 
energy in PICTs and the impact this development has had and is having in a global context.  
 
As an isolated and depopulated territory, Tokelau would not be expected to be a leader in knowledge 
production and technological innovation for addressing the pressing global problem of climate change 
or the local conditions in an atoll nation that it is producing. The prevailing wisdom is that SIDS are 
non-competitive in entrepreneurship, yet this tiny nation became a global leader in climate change 
mitigation and adaptation by generating almost all of its electricity with solar photovoltaic panels 
through the Tokelau Renewable Energy Project (TREP). How was Tokelau able to enact such 
progressive energy policy   local and global effects? What explains this innovation? 
 
This thesis aims to explain how SNIJs and SIDS are essential categories linking global environmental 
politics to entrepreneurship and innovation. By looking at the relationships of small islands to the 
wider discourse, it aims to understand how islands have exerted agency to become key players in the 
climate change debate. In order to examine this relationship, this paper uses the case study of TREP 
and the following methods: 
• comprehensive literature review in the fields of island innovation and global environmental 
politics; 
• analysis of historical relationship of SIDS with their colonial powers and the United Nations 
system; 
• documentation of how Tokelau emerged at the forefront of renewable energy action in the 
Pacific region and the agency this developed; 
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• documentation of the local, national and international socio-economic processes that 
influenced the development of TREP; 
• analysis of the impact that renewable projects such as TREP can have on discourse 
domestically and internationally; 
• identification of the advantages and disadvantages that insularity poses to developing 
renewable energy projects such as TREP. 
 
In order to investigate these questions, the research examines perspectives of the various TREP 
stakeholders including the Government of Tokelau, New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade, contracted companies and the United Nations Development Program. A semester in 2015 
spent in the Geography and Pacific Studies Departments of the University of Auckland was valuable 
for shaping research questions, background data on renewables projects in the Pacific and working 
with and interviewing scholars that are experts on the Pacific. Attending conferences, including the 
Caribbean Renewable Energy Forum in Miami was useful for comparing progress of renewables in 
SIDS in other parts of the world. 
 
The bulk of the research in the Pacific Islands took place between May and August of 2015, with time 
spent in Niue, Tuvalu, Fiji and Samoa. Due to the two-day boat ride and infrequent service to Tokelau, 
it was impossible to visit the islands, but meetings with various representatives of the Government of 
Tokelau based in Apia and Samoa provided the information needed to make up for this. Prior to his 
death in 2015, Aliki Faipule Foua Toloa, former Ulu and one of the key initiators of TREP, provided 
a great deal of knowledge for his motivations for the project and the role of Tokelau in global climate 
negotiations. Paula Faiva, Tokelau’s Climate Change Manager, also provided her inputs in Tokelau’s 
development of renewable energy and its effect on relationships with international organizations. 
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Access to the archives of the Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environmental Program (SPREP) in 
Apia also proved to be a valuable resource of documents on renewable energy programs in the region. 
As renewable energy is a relatively new and under-resourced part of SPREP’s work, there was a lack 
of specific information in this area. However, there were many documents relating to the history and 
regional planning of Tokelau that were useful for contextual analysis of the project, such as 
administrator reports, national strategic plans and climate change impact assessments. A visit to 
Thomas Jensen at the UNDP offices provided many technical and background documents on TREP 
itself, including copies of the many site assessments and reports on the prospect of Tokelauan 
renewable energy in the decade leading up to the installation.
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Chapter 2: Literature review 
 
“We are not major contributors to global greenhouse gas emissions… but we believe that if we are to show moral 
leadership then we have to lead by example.” 
-Dr. James Fletcher, Minister of Energy for St Lucia at  
Paris United Nations Climate Conference (GreenTV, 2015) 
 
Islands are not commonly seen as places of innovation. Discourses in the fields of political economy 
and economic development in particular situate them as occupying colonial backwaters, with citizens 
that lack the power to govern themselves effectively and drive their own development. Yet small island 
developing states (SIDS) are leading the way in renewables and have set some of the most ambitious 
targets for renewable energy penetration worldwide (Dornan, 2015). These actions are driven by the 
increasing costs of traditional fossil-fuels and islanders’ desire to exert pressure on major greenhouse 
gas emitters to provide an alternative to carbon-intensive economies. Most importantly, the impetus 
for this action is typically driven by islanders themselves and represents the coalescence of multiple 
kinds of island innovations. 
 
There are two central themes of research in this study. It will first examine ideas of economic 
competitiveness in SIDS development and their relationship to neoliberal globalization. The review 
identifies trends in development literature and provides insight into the place of SIDS in economic 
discourse as weak and vulnerable, and then turns to alternative theories that have been presented. This 
knowledge is vital for understanding the mechanisms for development and the special cases of SIDS. 
Secondly, the environmental politics literature informs our understanding of SIDS’ role in global 
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climate discourse. It sheds light on how environmental change has given SIDS new agency both locally 
and on the international stage and how they are using this opportunity to take an increased role in 
international affairs. 
 
2.1 Competitiveness in Small Island Developing States 
Sustainable development is a vital concern for SIDS, which have traditionally been seen as 
uncompetitive and facing barriers that exclude any real opportunity for growth. The private sectors of 
small countries are seen as fundamentally disadvantaged due to globalization, preventing them from 
generating competitive exports or attracting significant amounts of foreign investment. 
 
The isolated geography of SIDS is inevitably tied to theories of development. The conventional 
wisdom holds out that isolation and small population are the primary dictators preventing robust 
economic development. For example, Winters & Martins (2004) directly examine through quantitative 
analysis claims that high costs of transportation to the rest of the world inhibit small remote countries. 
The paper hypothesizes that small remote places are inherently uncompetitive due to factors such as 
the high transportation costs. It uses several techniques to focus on remoteness and differentiate that 
effect from size, but concedes it is impossible to fully differentiate these two factors and that SIDS 
and SNIJs, which “face such great absolute disadvantages that exporting at world prices is either 
impossible or generates factor incomes that are too low to subsist” (p348). There is no shortage of 
research that suggests SIDS suffer from smallness and isolation. Research such as Briguglio (1995) 
and Guillaumont (2010) conclude that small size and demographic factors impact vulnerability and 
these are the main barriers to development and participation in the global economic system for small 
states. Winters & Martins ultimately argue that “free trade could mean no trade for these economies” 
(p348). 
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Not all academics agree that smallness equates to stunted growth. Easterly & Kraay (2000) state that 
small states have “received excessive attention from the literature”, highlighting an emphasis on their 
vulnerability is unwarranted as they seem to often have higher incomes per capita than their mainland 
neighbors and that there is no evidence of lower growth rates. They continue to say that policy advice 
for small states should be no different from those of larger states. However, the focus is on the 
smallness of states, and does assess the effects of isolation or transportation difficulties, which would 
have different impacts on Pacific SIDS than other small countries such as Luxembourg and Djibouti. 
Selwyn (1980) argues that the category of islands is an illegitimate social construct that has little impact 
on an economy. This critique argues that peripherality and marginalization are important factors in 
economic development, but the impact is no different to that of a remoter mainland area. 
 
This discussion of smallness often discounts alternatives and perpetuates the idea that smallness 
equates to vulnerability and low growth. Amoamo (2011) argues that the framing of islands as fragile, 
small, peripheral and dependent is often assumed, and is entwined with the discourse of vulnerability. 
Baldacchino (2015) contends that the very idea of independence for many small states was seen as 
extravagant and precarious both before and after the event, and colonial powers doubted economic 
or political viability. Concerns over independent states’ involvement in global politics were also 
outlined, and colonial powers often feared the loss of support from their former colonies. Baldacchino 
then argues that the belittling nature of discussion around SIDS maintains this negative discourse. 
 
The vulnerability discourse in political economy and development studies has led to the development 
of the migration-remittances, aid-bureaucracy (MIRAB) economy as the fundamental development 
model, whereby economies rely almost entirely on the outflow of their population to send back money 
and the inflow of foreign aid with associated public sector workforce to power their economy (Bertram 
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& Walters, 1985). Authors such as Poirine (1998) & Bertram (2004) have pointed out that MIRAB 
represents a useful mode of development for Pacific SIDS to use the only competitive advantages 
they may have, based on a population able to emigrate for work and to build a diaspora that can lobby 
for aid. Likewise, Connell (2013) insists MIRAB has ensured the continued viability of many of the 
smallest nations, including Tokelau. 
 
Many neoliberal economists have been critical of the MIRAB model as a valid pathway to sustainable 
development (McKee & Tisdell, 1988). This has caused the exertion of pressure on small countries to 
comply with principles of free trade and join organizations such as the World Trade Organization 
(WTO). Wallis (2010) assessed Tonga’s accession to the WTO and concludes the costs outweigh the 
benefits, and the neoliberal agenda has damaged the economy of Tonga. Furthermore, no transition 
away from a remittance and aid dependent economy was achieved, supporting the conclusion that a 
neoliberal approach is inappropriate for small Pacific economies. This approach sees insularity as a 
problem without recognizing the threat of global integration to PICTs, which otherwise might protect 
their economies through astute trade preferences; though their ability to do so has declined 
dramatically as they have signed on to global and regional trade accords. 
 
Connell (2013) states that “islanders have sought to develop cultural continuity with social change and 
economic development” and concludes that a form of hybridity can be found to maximize benefits 
to island communities, merging indigenous practices with capitalism. He discusses proactive and 
opportunistic islanders crafting their own destiny in the face of serious challenges as a suitable way of 
negotiating the risks of interacting with a neoliberal economy and an increasingly globalizing world. 
Connell argues that the neoliberal perspective neglects the islanders’ own advantages and 
contributions to their own destiny, and that SIDS can exert agency and not be held back by many of 
 21 
the problems faced by larger globalized economies. In this way, islanders can tackle the problems that 
specifically affect them most such as climate change through innovations using island advantages. 
 
Building from these assertions, SIDS are also conceptualized as places for development and 
entrepreneurship and laboratories of innovation in which small jurisdictions and insularity encourage 
resourcefulness and entrepreneurship, suggesting that there is much more to island survival than a 
MIRAB economy where innovation is a local response to tackle global issues to suit island needs 
(Kelman et al., 2015). Baldacchino (2015) compiled the first publication to consider islands wholly in 
the context of entrepreneurship, identifying the political categorization of sub-national island 
jurisdictions (SNIJs) as a source of innovation and the advantages and disadvantages islanders face in 
innovation.  Diaspora is a second source of entrepreneurship and innovation. This paper outlines 
three categories of innovation from islanders: entrepreneurship in small business, new governance 
structures, and developing new cultural practices. Limited resources combined with island thinking 
are seen as the key drivers of innovation.  
 
These responses to the conventional wisdom of non-competitiveness and marginality highlight the 
ways that islanders are central to their own future and have agency to make their own choices. 
According to Baldacchino (2015), “all too often, one is here faced with a situation in which the... the 
islander… becomes object matter: a ‘looked at’ reference group; stages for the enactment of processes 
dictated from elsewhere” (p. 7). Many of these authors see islanders as succeeding in entrepreneurship 
outside of the neoliberal framework and continuing to innovate. This research exists mostly in cold-
water SNIJs such as Prince Edward Island and Iceland, and neglects many of the cultural and 
geographical nuances of the Pacific.  
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Specifically, the gap that this paper contributes to is linking innovation to renewable energy in the 
Pacific region, and to the wider discourse of climate change – and more broadly, how global 
environmental politics yield opportunities for agency and innovation. Many of the attributes of 
islandness have led this region to become a world leader in developing sustainable energy, yet it has 
been relatively neglected by academic scholarship. Where it has been covered, the projects are seen as 
the achievements of outsiders, and little credit has been given to islanders themselves. This paper 
assesses how SIDS in the Pacific have exerted agency to change this discourse, and specifically how 
Tokelau was able to drive its own renewable future with indigenous thinking and to achieve 100% of 
its electricity generation from solar. 
 
2.2 Islands and global environmental politics 
The review above leads to the conclusion that small states are not generally considered to impact the 
agenda of superpowers, or more generally the direction of global geopolitics. However, Bernal (2015), 
as Jamaican Ambassador to Washington, refutes this with his analysis of Jamaica’s impact on United 
States foreign policy through his experience as Jamaican Ambassador to Washington. Bernal argues 
against the conventional wisdom that small developing states exert limited influence on the behaviors 
of large superpowers such as the United States, and that their actions and affairs are routinely 
disregarded by these superpowers. Through the Jamaican-US case study, he illustrates the impact that 
small nations can have on large nations through building influential diaspora and retaining the links to 
these communities once established. Jamaica was able to mobilize support for its interests on Capitol 
Hill and receive some preferential trade treatment and significant debt relief, including one of the first 
debt-for-nature swaps.  
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This is a useful parallel to SIDS’ process of becoming a key part of dialogue in global environmental 
politics; they have used the global environmental agenda to express agency in the discussion and affect 
policy change. Despite only registering 5% of the world’s population, SIDS make up over 20% of the 
United Nations member states, and so have an advantage in numbers and vote at key events and have 
played a role disproportionate to their size and strength at international climate negotiations (Barnett, 
2005). For example, small states are well known to be courted by pro-whaling powers such as Japan 
in the International Whaling Commission and to leverage their votes for foreign aid (Strand and 
Tuman 2012). The small economies of SIDS mean that relatively small investments of foreign aid can 
be very important for their economies, and so this innovation in vote exchange is an important method 
for them to raise funds, though which they are also impacting international environmental politics.  
 
The formation of the Association of Small Islands States (AOSIS) in 1990 has been a fundamental 
driver of SIDS voices and has succeeded in getting its discourse in the final agreements at climate 
negotiations (de Águeda Corneloup & Mol, 2014). AOSIS and SIDS generally lack structural power 
available to large state actors so must find leadership in other ways but have been able to use moral 
arguments and environmental leadership strategies to influence opinions and make their voices heard 
(de Águeda Corneloup & Mol, 2014). SIDS governments seek to achieve discursive hegemony by 
building coalitions such as AOSIS to promote their story to the top of the agenda and using scientific 
support to bolster claims. SIDS such as Tuvalu have also succeeded in driving an emotional story that 
has helped to generate sympathetic public opinion in their favor (Farbotko & McGregor, 2010). This 
is a form of entrepreneurial leadership innovation (de Águeda Corneloup & Mol, 2014). 
 
Shibuya (1996) shows the origin of the island voice on climate change and the course that it followed 
since the early 1990s and that AOSIS played a major part in getting global attention to the issue of 
 24 
climate change by using low lying islands as a crisis issue. Farbotko and McGregor (2010) describe 
how the Tuvalu delegation successfully forced a suspension of the Copenhagen conference by leading 
a walk-out. However, the extent and scope of SIDS influence has limits. De Águeda Corneloup & 
Mol (2014) point out that at COP15 “the entrepreneurial leadership strategies of SIDS were forcefully 
overruled by the structural power of the large Annex-1 states and the emerging economies” (p. 290). 
This appears to have changed at COP21 with greater success by AOSIS, though it is too early to see 
the results and the complex international politics makes it almost impossible to isolate and identify a 
single driver of outcomes. 
 
At the United Nations, AOSIS has been the main representative of island voices, but other 
international groupings have been important in shaping the discourse and forming lobbying groups in 
the international political arena. The African, Caribbean & Pacific (ACP) group of states was created 
by the Georgetown Agreement in 1975 and the small vulnerable economies (SVE) informal grouping 
used by the World Trade Organization (WTO), but neither of these are exclusively island groupings 
(Birkbeck & Harbourd, 2011). The ACP started as an alliance of former European colonies and 
protectorates to enhance members’ economic development and global integration. This encouraged 
some South-South cooperation between the members, but primarily allowed them to negotiate 
preferential trade agreements with the European Union. These agreements were questioned by the 
United States as a violation of free trade under the WTO, and subsequently the benefits offered to 
many SIDS were reduced. For example, the preferential treatment given to Caribbean countries had 
allowed the continuation of many smaller plantations on islands that would be uncompetitive when 
forced to compete in a free world market (Anania, 2010). The reductions of preferences to many 
Caribbean SIDS damaged their banana exports once preferences were lifted and they were forced to 
compete with cheaper Central American products. 
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By contrast, island dependencies and territories have not had an independent platform to voice their 
views. The United States, Australia, the United Kingdom, France and New Zealand all retain control 
over island territories in the Pacific region, and political associations of these states with their 
territories affect the capacity of the territory to respond to climate change discourse (Barnett, 2005). 
Each territory has a unique relationship with its main power and Grydehøj (2011) argues that the 
governments of SNIJs are disproportionately large but can be used both to the advantage or 
disadvantage of the population according to this relationship and its level of democratic 
responsiveness. McElroy & Pearce (2006) argue that SNIJs have an advantage over similar sovereign 
nations that leads to a superior economic performance and better quality of life due to the astute use 
of their autonomous privileges. In some cases, this leads to islanders repeatedly voting to retain their 
status quo of semi-autonomous political status, lacking full sovereignty and decision-making power. 
 
In the Pacific, several international organizations enable island states to advocate for island issues 
through regional cooperation; these include the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), Secretariat of the Pacific 
Regional Environmental Program (SPREP) and the Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA). 
However, the diversity of island voices and distinct interests within the Pacific can be a challenge for 
the development of a unified front (Barnett, 2005). SNIJs have had varying success in engaging with 
these forums. For example, those with greater autonomy such as Niue and the Cook Islands can 
effectively represent themselves at international forums but others with less constitutional autonomy 
on foreign relations such as Pitcairn Island and Tokelau are often beholden to the views of the larger 
political power of which they are a part. PIF has Niue and the Cook Islands as full members, French 
Polynesia and New Caledonia as associate members and Wallis and Futuna, Tokelau, American Samoa 
and Guam as observer members, distinguishing the level of participation based on the political status 
of the island. Australia and New Zealand are also full member states. These eight SNIJs are also 
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represented as full members of SPREP, along with the associated developed countries of United 
Kingdom, United States, Australia, New Zealand and France. Pitcairn Island, the only Pacific territory 
of the UK, is directly represented in neither body. There is a dearth of literature analyzing the ways 
that the populations of these SNIJs participate in the global decision-making framework on 
environmental issues, the factors that influence the nature of their participation and the ways that they 
innovate to achieve their policy objectives by navigating the political relationships that SNIJ status 
presents. 
 
SNIJs like Tokelau are represented at global UN negotiations by their associated UN member, but 
may find that their views do not directly align with those of the member state that represents them. 
At UN conferences, Tokelau generally finds itself more allied with the AOSIS coalition, but its 
constitutional relationship with New Zealand limits its ability to directly act on the decisions it would 
like to happen. By working with associated groups such as PIF and SPREP, SNIJs like Tokelau are 
able to still have their agenda heard through the voices of other member states. The Coalition of low 
lying Atoll Nations on Climate Change (CANCC) has also given Tokelau a platform to promote its 
cause by allying with the sovereign nations of Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, the Maldives and Tuvalu. 
As Tokelau is the only CANCC member without a vote at the UN, this has become a new platform 
to develop an independent voice away from New Zealand with support from sovereign nations with 
aligned interests. The navigation of these various negotiating platforms is an important political 
innovation that Tokelau, and other SNIJs, have developed to have their interests represented. 
 
SIDS engagements with these organizations are dynamic and rapidly evolving, making it difficult for 
researchers to keep track of the quickly changing pace of international climate negotiations. There is 
little academic writing available on the role of SNIJs at global climate negotiations despite their 
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important roles and contributions to the debate through moral leadership. There is also no research 
on Tokelau’s role, despite its leadership, and the advantages and disadvantages that its constitutional 
relationship with New Zealand offers. This study contributes to filling these gaps by identifying the 
kinds of innovations at play in Tokelau’s effort to developing political and navigate global climate 
politics in a Pacific context.  
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Chapter 3: The story of Tokelau 
 
“The thing that the elders are certain about is that Fakaofo won in the end; Nukunonu was conquered and the people 
who had lived in Atafu fled away upon the ocean” 
-Matagi Tokelau: History and Traditions of Tokelau (Office for Tokelau Affairs, 1991) 
 
3.1 Physical setting 
Any conversation of Tokelau with an outsider must first confront the remoteness of the islands. The 
Pacific is a sea of remote islands, but Tokelau’s isolation as an entire nation stands out in a way perhaps 
only paralleled in the Pacific Ocean by that of Pitcairn Island. Tokelau’s entire existence is orientated 
around its remoteness and connection to the sea. Tokelau’s 12km2 of land area make it the smallest in 
size of the non-self-governing territories in the Pacific, and the atolls are so low-lying that they can 
barely be seen from just a few miles off shore. 
 
The atolls each have large central lagoons, far greater in area than the narrow sandy strips of land that 
surround them. Each is fully encircled by a barrier reef, and there are no deep water channels between 
the atolls and the open ocean. The atolls have no naturally occurring freshwater, except the thin 
freshwater lenses that collect just below the surface from rainwater falling on the land area that can 
be accessed through shallow wells. The main food crops include coconut, breadfruit and pandanus, 
with fish, turtles, sea birds and coconut crab also supplementing the traditional local diet. 
 
The three atolls of Atafu, Nukunonu and Fakaofo share a common language and political system but 
are almost as remote and inaccessible from each other as from the nearest transport hub in Samoa. 
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Tokelauans are banned from travelling between them on their personal transport due to the number 
of islanders who were lost at sea making the long crossings. If Tokelau has a corresponding ‘mainland’, 
the closest would be Samoa. Tokelau has no airport and so to access the islands one must fly to Samoa 
and take the forty-eight hour 500km crossing on the ferry that leaves once a fortnight. The boat itself 
is renowned for being an uncomfortable ride, and is essentially a cargo vessel with room made on the 
deck for passengers. All ships must anchor in the open ocean and use small boats to transfer food to 
land, where islanders, a forklift or mobile crane transfer cargo onto island trucks.  
 
A fourth atoll, called Olohega or Swains Island lies between Tokelau and Samoa. The island is 
historically and culturally part of Tokelau, but in 1856 an American named Eli Hutchinson Jennings 
established a coconut plantation on the island. Jennings and his ancestors effectively ruled the island 
as a semi-independent dynasty until the 1920s, although it was later officially claimed by the United 
States under the 1860 Guano Islands Act and is now administered as part of the territory of American 
Samoa. While many Tokelauans continue to claim Olohega as an integral part of Tokelau’s territory 
to this day, this is not recognized by New Zealand or the United States. 
 
3.2 Pre-colonial history 
Archaeological evidence and Tokelauan oral history indicate that the atolls were most likely settled 
between 700 and 1000 years ago, although there is evidence of some human settlement on Olohega 
as far back as 500AD. The islands were most likely sporadically inhabited for the first few centuries, 
but by the time Europeans arrived there was already an established indigenous settlement on the 
islands. It is unknown when exactly each island became permanently settled, but genealogies suggest 
at least six generations had lived there prior to the arrival of blackbirders in 1863 who enslaved much 
of the population (Molloy & Hunstman, 1996). 
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Precolonial history was complex and dynamic, and very different to the timeless image of harmonious 
Polynesians living idyllic lives under the coconut trees portrayed by many visitors to the South Pacific 
at that time. In the late 1700s, the atolls of Tokelau existed as a Polynesian kingdom under the 
hegemony of the Chiefs of Fakaofo, who conquered Nukunonu and destroyed the village on Atafu. 
These mutually hostile atolls were expected to pay tribute and send women to Fakaofo, causing 
disputes to erupt periodically. At around the year 1800, Nukunonu was still subjugated whilst Atafu 
was repopulated by settlers from Fakaofo. Olohega was an outpost with settlers from Fakaofo 
exporting produce back to the dominant atoll. 
 
European exploration of the atolls was spread from 1765 until 1825 but had little impact on the local 
population until the 1840s. Fakaofo’s dominance was first challenged in the 1850s and a famine 
drastically reduced its population. In 1861, the two subordinate atolls of Atafu and Nukunonu 
converted to Christianity in an explicit rejection of Fakaofo’s gods and their dominance. Catholic 
missionaries gained the most influence on Nukunonu as a returning island convert spread the faith, 
paving the way for missionaries. In Atafu missionaries arrived from the protestant London Missionary 
Society (LMS). Meanwhile, Olohega moved into private ownership with the arrival of Jennings and 
his plantation business. 
 
Fakaofo rejected foreign missionaries until 1863 when the island suffered another devastating decline 
in population, this time due to the arrival of blackbirding ships from Peru which were raiding islands 
across the Pacific to find slaves for the mines of South America. Tokelau was one of the worst affected 
areas in the region, reducing the populations of Fakaofo and Nukunonu by around 50% to 200 and 
63 respectively by the end of 1863 (Maude, 1981). This drop in population was the fall of Fakaofo’s 
supremacy and preceded the arrival of missionaries who received little resistance after the removal of 
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so many island men. Given the relatively larger size of the island population, both LMS and Catholic 
missionaries arrived in Fakaofo, who were also joined by some additional male settlers from Portugal 
and Samoa who assimilated into the local population and helped with its recovery. Following the 
decimation of the population and colonialism the struggle for dominance between the islands became 
less pronounced (Hoëm, 2015). 
 
This pre-contact history shows that Tokelau had a dynamic political history for centuries, and did not 
exist as a single polity with equal island power until modern times. The social differences between the 
atolls continue to exist today and impact contemporary local politics as each atoll council insisting 
they must be treated equally without preference given to the others, while equally competing for their 
own preferential treatment. This local politics has an impact on the development of the islands and is 
one of the reasons an airport was never constructed on the islands. It would be politically challenging 
and culturally impossible to allow the construction of an airport on one atoll lest it gain an advantage 
over the other two, while also being financially impractical to construct airstrips on all three islands. 
 
3.3 The British Empire to 19485 
At the point of colonization by Europeans, each atoll had maintained its own unique culture. However, 
to outsiders these were seen as homogenous communities and they were grouped into a single entity 
under colonial rule. In 1877 the islands, then known as the Union Islands, fell under the protection of 
the United Kingdom with the Western Pacific Order, which established a High Commissioner to the 
Western Pacific, responsible for jurisdiction of British subjects on unclaimed islands in the region. 
This was partly a response to the episodes of blackbirding in the region to give greater protection to 
                                                
5 This section draws heavily on Angelo & Pasikale (2008). 
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Pacific Islanders from marauding vessels. In 1889 the islands were officially incorporated into the 
British Empire as a protectorate, and the Union Jack was raised on Nukunonu, Atafu and Fakaofo. In 
1916 the Union Islands were incorporated into the Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony. During this 
period the islands remained a largely subsistence economy with traditional governance by the island 
chiefs, although with strong influence from missionaries. 
 
In 1926 the Tokelau Islands were disannexed from the British Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony and 
came under the administration of New Zealand as part of Western Samoa, which had been given to 
New Zealand from Germany by mandate of the United Nations. The Tokelauan chain was largely 
neglected by New Zealand during this period with occasional visits from a New Zealand administrator 
and trading ships collecting copra. Services were largely provided by the missions and were 
rudimentary.  
 
Tokelau formally became part of New Zealand on January 1, 1949, and islanders became New Zealand 
citizens according to the British Nationality and New Zealand Citizenship Act (1948), in line with the 
changing relationship between the United Kingdom and New Zealand and formation of New Zealand 
citizenship. The Letters Patent Constituting the Officer of Governor-General of New Zealand (1983) 
split the Realm of New Zealand into five parts: the state of New Zealand, the self-governing states of 
the Cook Islands and Niue, the Ross Dependency (a dependency of the state of New Zealand) and 
Tokelau (a territory of the state of New Zealand). 
 
Tokelau’s modern relationship with New Zealand has defined its current existence and allowed it to 
receive special preference in many areas. If the islands had remained as an outlying jurisdiction of a 
neighboring SIDS that they were once grouped with under colonial rule, such as modern Kiribati, 
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Samoa or Tuvalu, they could have remained marginalized parts of these countries with little agency to 
express themselves internationally. In these modern states, outer islands continue to be 
underdeveloped and inaccessible compared to their capital island and Tokelau could have risked a 
similar fate, particularly given its status as a cultural and linguistic minority group. Instead, as a SNIJ 
of New Zealand, they have been able to carve their own brand as a somewhat autonomous nation, 
with the benefits of association with a larger, richer power. 
 
3.4 The independence debate6 
New Zealand began to invest in island development from the 1950s in areas such as transport, 
communications, education and health. In 1962 the UN’s ‘Declaration on the Independence of 
Colonial Peoples’, New Zealand increased the amount of self-government given to the islands, leading 
to the devolution of many political powers and increased provision of services. When Western Samoa 
gained its independence in 1962, Tokelau was given the choice to join them in independence or 
affiliate with the Cook Islands, but Tokelau asked to continue its current relationship with New 
Zealand as a discrete dependent entity. This caused a wave of migration leading to the development 
of the Tokelauan diaspora in New Zealand, where they held legal right to live due to citizenship. 
 
In 1980, the United States and New Zealand signed the Treaty of Tokehega, in which the United 
States relinquished its claims over Fakaofo, Atafu and Nukunonu, but asserted American sovereignty 
over Olohega. Although each of the Tokelauan Faipule signed this treaty, there have been claims this 
was under extreme pressure from New Zealand and that the islanders overall did not want to lose an 
island they viewed as part of Tokelau. The claim resurfaced in 2006 when a draft constitution that was 
                                                
6 Huntsman & Kalolo (2007) outline the relationship between Tokelau and New Zealand, documenting the influence of 
the United Nations leading up to the independence referenda. 
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the subject of the 2006 self-determination referendum confirmed Tokelau’s continued claim over 
Olohega. Some Tokelauans continue to accuse New Zealand of ignoring Tokelauan viewpoints in 
signing this treaty and giving local officials little option but to sign the agreement, illustrating the 
tension that can be felt between the relationship of state and territory (Tagata Pasifika, 2009). 
 
The creation of Tokelau as its own separate jurisdiction paved the way for the concept of nationhood. 
Subsequent amendments and additional laws gradually increased autonomy and in 1994 powers were 
delegated from the Administrator to the General Fono, moving Tokelau from under New Zealand 
Administration to Self-Government within New Zealand. The General Fono were given full national 
law making power in 1996, although remained subordinate to the New Zealand Parliament who could 
override their decisions. This even allowed Tokelau to engage in its first independent international 
relations, and in 1996 it signed an MOU with the Government of Tuvalu on possible methods for 
cooperation between the two atoll nations. Tokelau has also participated fully with and independently 
from New Zealand in regional organizations such as the Forum Fisheries Agency, the Secretariat of 
the Pacific Community, the Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environmental Program, and the 
Council of the University of the South Pacific.  The Pacific Islands Forum granted Tokelau observer 
status in 2005. 
 
Tokelau became an anomaly that is still unresolved as the two referendums on the islands’ self-
governance failed to gather the support needed to pass. This was a much different path to Niue and 
the Cook Islands, which originated from similar political arrangements but became self-governing in 
free association with New Zealand in 1974 and 1965 respectively. Tokelau was urged by the UN to 
follow this path, which would retain the coveted New Zealand citizenship and financial support. 
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However, reassurance of this protection failed to assuage worries of the wary Tokelauans, and the 
status quo remained, much to the consternation of New Zealand and the UN. 
 
As the second smallest territory falling under the United Nations Special Committee on 
Decolonization, Tokelau went through two UN mandated referendums to determine its future status. 
This committee was established in 1961 in order to oversee the decolonization process in the various 
remaining colonial entities existing around the world. There are 3 ways for a colony to self-determine: 
independence, free association, or integration. Tokelau’s politicians elected to vote to become a state 
in free association with New Zealand, like Niue and the Cook Islands, and this change in status was 
to be established by referendum. As a state in a free association, Tokelauans would retain New Zealand 
citizenship and New Zealand would continue to provide defense and economic assistance to the 
islands. 
 
The first referendum in 2006 lacked just 35 votes to meet the two-thirds majority required to pass, 
and so the islands maintained their current status. This very narrow margin led to a second referendum 
in 2007, as Tokelauan leaders were concerned that expatriates influenced the decision, despite their 
ineligibility to vote. This second referendum also failed, by an even smaller margin of just 16 votes. 
Politicians have since called for another referendum, asking for it to be decided by a simple majority 
which would likely pass in favor of free association. The main reasons indicated by those who voted 
against free association were a concern that it could affect their New Zealand citizenship, and thus the 
ability to move and work freely between the nations. However, most Tokelauan and New Zealand 
politicians supported the move and tried to assuage these fears through community outreach in both 
countries. 
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Unlike the Cook Islands and Niue, Tokelau is not officially classified by the UN as a SIDS, due to its 
constitutional relationship with New Zealand. Although the former two countries are not formal 
members, they have full treaty-making capacity recognized by the United Nations. At most UN talks, 
Tokelau has been represented as part of New Zealand sometimes without a Tokelauan member on 
the New Zealand delegation. At other times, New Zealand has allowed Tokelau to take center stage, 
such as the UN SIDS conference where the Tokelauan political leader, the Ulu o Tokelau, represented 
New Zealand at the opening speeches (Nasau, 2014). Tokelau has also attended UNFCCC 
conferences as part of the New Zealand delegation. The Ulu of Tokelau announced the Tokelau 
Renewable Energy Project (TREP) at the COP17 Durban Conference and was able to do so in a way 
that appeared independent of New Zealand. In taking this strategy, Tokelau is able to maximize the 
utility it gets from working with New Zealand, and also sometimes appearing as an independent entity.  
 
3.5 Tokelauan society 
Traditionally there existed a complex hierarchical social structure both between and within islands. 
Hooper & Huntsman (1991) characterize the traditional island relationships in terms of traditional 
family structure, with Fakaofo as the oldest brother, Atafu the younger brother and Nukunonu the 
sister’s son. Tokelauan identities are still often constructed around the kaiga, or family groups, and 
responsibility to the home atolls, rather than allegiance to Tokelau as a whole. Like other Polynesian 
societies, kinship is an important part of the socio-political makeup of Tokelau, and the kaiga control 
and allocate many resources within the islands. The fakaTokelau, or Tokelauan way, resembles an 
ancient quasi-communist system whereby everyone gets a basic wage and is required to work for the 
community. In addition to their different religions, each atoll has its own variation of fakaTokelau, 
with acute cultural differences, and the inati, a Tokelauan way of sharing fish catches fairly among the 
community.  
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The geographical nature of the three islands with similar sized populations have given rise to a unique 
political structure, whereby the Ulu rotates annually to each island, with the Faipule of Nukunonu, 
Fakaofo and Atafu each holding the title for one year. The Faipule terms are three years, so after each 
has been overall chief for a year elections are held by each island and the cycle is repeated. The historic 
domination of Fakaofo means that each island is reluctant to give the other island more importance 
than the other, and so Tokelau has no official capital. In fact, Tokelau’s administration is entirely based 
out of Apia, Samoa. Samoa is not just the origin of the only scheduled vessel to the islands but a 
cultural origin of missionaries and priests since colonization, and the Samoan language is widely 
spoken in Tokelau. The ferry that visits the islands is also the only means of inter-atoll transportation, 
thus there are few opportunities to encourage inter-atoll trade. 
 
The Tokelau Public Service employs the majority of islanders, with the rest mostly working for the 
Taupulega, as the islands are home to little private industry. In the past, copra provided a major export 
crop but has not been economically viable to export for many years. Annual GDP is US$1.5 million 
and New Zealand funds most of government costs. Income from fishing licenses in the EEZ are the 
second biggest contribution to government funds. Many households supplement their income with 
remittances from family in New Zealand and Australia. The Tokelau International Trust Fund is 
another important economic support mechanism, and aims to support the long-term financial 
sustainability of the islands and has a value of over US$50 million (Government of Tokelau, 2014). 
 
This economic reliance on New Zealand created a close relationship enabling the Government of 
Tokelau to request a loan to cover the costs of the Tokelau Renewable Energy Project (TREP). This 
was in accordance with the existing aid-reliant economy of Tokelau, and a natural source of the funds. 
It did also limit Tokelau in sourcing the money, as if New Zealand had been unwilling to provide them 
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there could have been few additional options remaining. The fakaTokelau also influenced the project, 
and shaped the entrepreneurship process. In Tokelau, things move slowly and cautiously, and there is 
little appetite for risk-taking. This is somewhat of a paradox, as it was a pioneer of renewable energy 
in the region, but could be explained by the urgency that came from the high electricity prices and 
from climate change. Tokelau also initiated the process of exploring renewables very early, with 
prototype projects installed in 2002 to prove to the islands the value of the technology. 
 
3.6 The diaspora  
There are more Tokelauans living in the diaspora than on the atolls themselves. There are some 7,000 
living in New Zealand and others in Hawai’i, Australia and worldwide. Tokelauans have long travelled 
around the Pacific, for religious training in Samoa and Tuvalu and further afield as missionaries. As 
full New Zealand citizens, Tokelauans have the right to move between New Zealand and their atolls 
and also some rights to live and work in Australia. Tokelauans living on Olohega became American 
citizens, with most migrating to American Samoa and many establishing communities in Hawaii and 
California. 
 
In 1951 only ten Tokelauans lived in New Zealand, but in the following decades thousands of islanders 
left their homeland for the promise of a better life. Conditions on the islands deteriorated after the 
impact of a severe hurricane in February 1966, leading to New Zealand’s creation of the Tokelau 
Islands Resettlement Scheme, and the government viewed the island communities as moribund. By 
1975 Tokelauans in New Zealand outnumbered those living on the atolls and the scheme was 
abandoned as the New Zealand government decided people should continue to live on the islands. 
 
 39 
Another factor was the independence of Western Samoa in 1962, as many Tokelauans were living in 
Apia at the time. Most of those living in Samoa at the time of independence became aliens in a foreign 
land and relocated to New Zealand. As citizens of New Zealand, Tokelauans were not legally subject 
to the same persecution as other Pacific Islanders, but as non-white immigrants were considered 
suspect by many of their compatriots. These problems on moving to New Zealand encouraged the 
formation of a tight-knit diaspora with a strong connection to their homeland. 
 
Despite representing just 0.02% of the New Zealand population, the Tokelauan community has 
retained its distinct culture and has a strong presence in public life. Tokelauans are concentrated 
around the capital of Wellington, unlike most other Pasifika groups which have stronger presences in 
Auckland. There is an annual Tokelau festival in Porirua, a Wellington suburb, and members of the 
diaspora visit from all over the world. The same city elected Kris Faafoi, the first MP of Tokelauan 
descent in New Zealand, who was born to migrants from Fakaofo. 
 
Tokelau’s continued relationship with the New Zealand diaspora has shaped its modern relations with 
a strong group to lobby for the islands in Wellington, which Bernal (2015) argues is essential for small 
states wanting to influence the policy of larger powers. Most Tokelauans have also spent time either 
living or working in New Zealand, and normally for longer periods due the cost and timing of 
transport. However, this relationship has also been harmful for Tokelau with a consistent brain drain 
of skilled workers, including those with the ability to repair and operate renewable energy systems. 
 
3.7 Climate change 
Sea level rise attributed to climate change is a problem facing countries worldwide, but is felt no more 
acutely than in atoll nations (IPPC, 2007). Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, the Maldives and Tokelau are 
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all nations at risk of disappearing entirely under the waves as global sea levels rise, residing just a few 
meters above the water. Ice sheets contain enormous quantities of frozen water, and if the Greenland 
Ice Sheet alone melted scientists estimate that sea levels could rise about 6 meters. Additionally, if the 
Antarctic Ice Sheet melted, sea level could rise by up to 60 meters (IPCC, 2014). Though this scenario 
is unlikely in the short term, Tokelau would only need a one-meter rise in sea level to lose most of its 
land area and make the islands uninhabitable. 
 
There are inconsistent explanations of the effects of sea level rise on atolls with some predicting a 
chronic increase in erosion and sea level rise (Dickinson, 1997) while others suggest that living reefs 
are resilient to climate change and could endure rising sea levels (Kench et al., 2005). Kench suggests 
that atolls are more dynamic that most people expect, and could keep up with a rapidly rising sea level 
as deposition occurs, but acknowledges this does not negate the serious environmental consequences 
of rising sea levels. It is likely that the permanent structures built on the islands could face serious 
damage, and would be unlikely to survive the changing geomorphology of the islands. This uncertainty 
adds an extra challenge for adaptation strategies in these countries. 
 
Regardless of the future existence of the atolls themselves, it is clear that there are significant issues 
regarding climate change facing their inhabitants. Atolls have no surface running water and rely entirely 
on harvesting groundwater that collects in a freshwater lens, which is supplemented by precipitation. 
Freshwater lenses are particularly vulnerable to contamination, and so in many islands the water supply 
is becoming polluted, endangering the population’s long term health, particularly in times of drought 
(IPPC, 2007). Coral bleaching and ocean acidification could also cause issues and reduce atolls’ ability 
to rebuild themselves, and more frequent tropical storms could increase erosion. 
 
 41 
Tokelau recognized its extreme vulnerability to climate change as far back as 1993, and has taken 
important steps to prepare for the issues that could arise because of this. The islands’ dispersed 
population means that engineering structures such as sea walls would be impractical and prohibitively 
expensive, but careful monitoring was started and safe houses constructed on each island for storms 
and high tides. Tokelau has also embraced international climate negotiations as an adaptation and 
mitigation strategy. By joining a chorus of other SIDS to argue for global reductions in greenhouse 
gas emissions, Tokelau has found a way both to potentially help reduce the impact of climate change 
on its islands, but also attract funding from larger countries to aid its adaptation strategies. 
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Chapter 4: The Tokelau Renewable Energy Project 
 
““We are here to convey the message that nowhere in all of these meetings, has Tokelau been able to have a voice in the 
policy development for adaptation and mitigation for climate change. We are part of that group of vulnerable nations 
most affected by climate change and yet do not have a presence within the formal discussions at the COP sessions.” 
-Aliki Faipule Foua Toloa at the COP17 (2011) 
 
4.1 Background 
The Tokelau Renewable Energy Project (TREP) was the culmination of years of careful planning and 
test projects that reflect the fakaTokelau, or Tokelauan way, which involves careful consideration and 
due process, taking a slow approach to ensure it works and no rash decisions (Huntsman & Kalolo, 
2007). Tokelau’s first National Energy Policy and Strategic Action Planning (NEPSAP) in 2004 
established a target for 100% renewable generation and energy independence (IRENA). The original 
proposals for 100% renewable included a coconut biofuel source of generation for backup, which was 
initially used rarely as the batteries themselves had enough capacity to provide sufficient storage. 
 
Prior to the installation of TREP, there were limited other renewables installations in Tokelau. The 
University of the South Pacific on Atafu had a small solar array and the telecommunications company 
TeleTok had panels powering its transmission stations. Diesel generators were used on each atoll to 
provide electricity, requiring annual imports of over 2,000 oil drums at the cost of NZ$1 million 
(Empower Consultants, 2008). Large volumes of diesel to power each unit were shipped on from 
Samoa, and the high cost of this fuel was a primary motivator for looking for other methods of 
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generation. Additionally, the risk posed by diesel spills damaging the fragile reef environment was an 
incentive to reduce diesel imports.  
 
In 2001, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) partnered with the Government of 
Tokelau to fund a pilot program to explore the feasibility of renewable energy sources on the islands 
(UNDP Suva, 2012). After several design iterations with input from the Government of Tokelau and 
external experts, a tender was issued in 2004 for a single pilot project in Fakaofo valued at US$320,000. 
Although the General Fono originally intended for a project on each atoll, budget limitations restricted 
the pilot to Fakaofo (Wade, 2004). The small 10kW project was initially a separate micro-grid which 
was later integrated into the island grid, helping prove to islanders that the technology could be used 
efficiently alongside the existing infrastructure. 
 
The TREP project itself was started in 2010 as a partnership between the Government of Tokelau 
(GoT) and the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFaT). The project culminated 
after a 5-month construction period ending in October 2012. For the construction, the GoT 
approached MFaT for a NZ$7 million loan. The 4,000 photovoltaic cells charge 1,300 lead-acid 
batteries and the systems were designed to meet 150% of the community’s energy needs. A New 
Zealand installation company, PowerSmart Solar NZ Ltd., was contracted by MFaT to install the 
system, with the assistance of IT Power (Australia) Pty Ltd. There was little to no expertise or 
experience with renewables on Tokelau, requiring the use of specialists brought in from New Zealand 
to provide training to Tokelauans (IT Power, 2013).  
 
The arrival of this project created profound cultural changes in Tokelau, as 24-hour electricity became 
available on the islands instead of the previous six hours per day. This drastically improved living 
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conditions by allowing increased access to the internet and improved education opportunities, factors 
which in turn contributed to encouraging young Tokelauans to stay on the islands. They also 
previously had to have someone watching the generators at all times while running, and the solar 
panels allowed less time actively watching them.  
 
However, there were some problems presented with the system, for example, the phenomenon of 
diesel creep. As electricity became available round the clock, demand increased for appliances such as 
freezers and electricity demand skyrocketed, meaning more diesel was needed to provide backup than 
originally anticipated. The plan to use coconut biodiesel to power this backup proved unfeasible due 
to its technological complexity, and some level of conventional fossil fuels were still needed for import. 
Despite the need for some diesel backup, media reports and island officials still continue to claim the 
title of 100% renewable, and to claim to be the first country to hold this position. Tokelauan 
government representatives have not claimed this title as an important mechanism for positioning 
Tokelau on the global climate stage, and necessary for its achievement to garner both local and global 
impacts from the project. The rest of the analysis draws out the multiple kinds of innovations that 
Tokelau developed, on its own and in relations with UNDP, New Zealand and through global 
negotiations to secure and stabilize the project and use it to move into a leadership position in climate 
negotiations. 
 
4.2 Tokelau’s political rationale 
The political economy of electricity generation in the lead up to TREP in Tokelau relied upon the 
development of local, national and global innovations that all worked through the SIDS context in 
varying ways. At the global level, the islands’ dependence on imported fuel created an inability to 
insulate themselves from global oil price shocks. Transportation delays due to bad weather also had 
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the potential to leave the islands without electricity. The user tariffs paid by residents for electricity 
were set at a national level but additionally required agreements from all three atoll Taupulega. Thus, 
pressure and resistance from community members limited the ability of politicians to increase the 
electricity tariff. Energy wasting was commonplace and the low price of electricity did little to 
encourage energy conservation. Combined with inefficient devices, it was clear there was a need to 
increase electricity prices, and the unique situation forced the government to find innovative ways of 
continuing to supply electricity to the islands in the face of these issues (IT Power, 2013). 
 
The calculation of a higher tariff to create a sustainable financial model would require political 
agreement from the three Taupulega, but the nature of insular politics on Tokelau as a small cohesive 
community-led to political inaction from politicians looking to be reelected. The Government of 
Tokelau heavily subsidized electricity prices. There was also an issue of unpaid consumer power bills, 
where enforcement becomes difficult in a small cohesive community. In 2008 the unpaid power bill 
was estimated to be over $20,000 per atoll. This represents a uniquely Tokelauan problem, whereby 
everybody knows everybody and so doing what is deemed necessary becomes politically impossible 
(Huntsman & Kalolo, 2007). Issues such as this might have been paralyzing for the economies of 
other communities, but Tokelau innovated to continue its electricity supply despite its serious 
sustainability issues. The Government of Tokelau hopes that with the arrival of more extensive 
electricity provision, innovative policy will be able to solve these issues to bolster the benefits of 
TREP. 
 
The movement to install TREP was driven by the Faipule of Fakaofo and one-time Ulu o Tokelau, 
Aliki Foua Toloa, who recognized the potentially global symbolism of the project in additional to the 
local economic and environmental gains and potential to provide a global platform for the issues his 
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nation faced. At the inauguration of the TREP project he acknowledged in his speech that Tokelau is, 
“too small to make any significant contribution to total world reduction in terms of GHG emission 
per person, but little by little if everyone contributes to the gradual reduction of GHG what a world 
it would be” (Weissbach, 2015). This humble contribution to greenhouse gas mitigation is also an 
innovative method of adaptation for Tokelau to improve the resilience of island communities against 
climate change. This innovation came from a need to showcase the islands on a global platform, as 
their extreme isolation and small size meant there was little media interest in local politics, despite the 
fact that external interest, particularly through financing, was essential for the project. Isolation also 
created the economic situation of extreme energy prices driving a project that would not be financially 
sustainable elsewhere in the world, working to drive innovation to shape a project that would meet 
the islands’ needs. 
 
4.3 New Zealand’s involvement 
Tokelau was able to realize the local project by engaging with New Zealand to solicit finance, as it was 
unlikely that it would have found the upfront costs to pay for the project. This is not least because 
many international institutions involved in global climate financing projects are bound to only give to 
projects in independent SIDS, and this definition often excludes Tokelau as a SNIJ of New Zealand. 
Additionally, Tokelau is limited by political factors in its ability to cofinance with most multilateral and 
bilateral donors. As part of New Zealand, with limited scope to engage in bilateral relations, Tokelau 
does not have the funding options and expertise available from donor nations that have financed 
renewable projects in many other Pacific island countries and territories (PICTs). Although Niue and 
the Cook Islands are eligible to access the Green Climate Fund, a pool of money donated by wealthy 
countries for climate change adaptation in developing countries, Tokelau is ineligible due to its 
constitutional relationship with New Zealand. This creates an interesting paradox since if the 
 47 
independence referendum had passed, Tokelau would have found itself eligible for many different 
funding sources. As a territory of New Zealand, Tokelau was able to use its special relationship to 
solicit funding unavailable to independent SIDS. It also benefitted from funding from UNDP who 
are more flexible than some other institutions in their ability to donate. However, its existing 
relationship with New Zealand made it the ideal location and it is possible a project on this scale would 
not have been possible without direct aid from New Zealand. 
 
Since Tokelau could provide the model for large remote independent grid systems in PICTs, New 
Zealand and other countries have started funding similar projects around the Pacific including the 
Cook Islands and Tuvalu. This is a way for New Zealand to expand its influence in the region and 
increase its green branding. Petroleum dependence is a problem across the Pacific Islands with many 
countries spending up to a third of their GDP on fossil fuels imports, exposing them to the volatility 
of the global oil market (Dornan & Spratt, 2014). As a result, many PICTs have expressed their interest 
in renewable resources and New Zealand has stepped in to help the capacity to fulfill these. This has 
particularly been in the Polynesian region, which has historically had closer ties to New Zealand. New 
Zealand also has considerable renewable energy expertise, generating 75% of electricity from hydro, 
geothermal and wind resources (Dornan & Spratt, 2014). Tokelau’s energy goals from NEPSAP were 
in line with the green aspirations of the New Zealand Government (Empower Consultants, 2008). As 
the projects are usually monitored from a remote location to ensure smooth operation, New Zealand 
has also promoted discussion of sending all PICTs renewable data to a specialized center to process 
and reduce costs, and pool knowledge of operating remote grids such as these. Local training has been 
important to solve routine issues, but for advanced projects outside expertise continues to be 
necessary and periodic visits from engineers will be needed. 
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Navigating the complex relationship between country and territory became a source of tension 
between Tokelauan leaders and their New Zealand counterparts. The project fitted in with the green 
image of New Zealand and so on a global platform New Zealand was sometimes quick to credit itself 
for carrying out the project, and perhaps neglected to credit Tokelau with driving it themselves. Both 
nations wanted to claim ownership as a source of pride in the international climate change agenda, 
and a policy innovation that would frame them as a global leader. For example, in a 2004 report, Wade 
described initial investigations as primarily motivated by the GoT, stating that the GoT requested the 
survey as they and the three taupulega recognized the “risk associated with being so strongly 
dependent on imported petroleum” (p8). Meanwhile the installation company, PowerSmart, credited 
the Tokelauan people with the impetus for the project (TEDx Talks, 2013). 
 
This ownership would enable New Zealand to become more respected on its climate change policy 
and help to retain its green image. For New Zealand, this was important as its government had been 
accused of neglecting to do enough to fight climate change, much to the consternation of its Pacific 
neighbors. It was surpassed by Australia, which was additionally blamed for actively sabotaging climate 
agreements by other Pacific island countries (Radio NZ, 2016). TREP allowed New Zealand to recoup 
its reputation on climate change and improve its relationship with other Pacific countries, by providing 
a location for a project that could take place with economic motivations but also positive 
environmental impacts. Tokelau utilized its SNIJ status to its advantage as a dimension to the 
innovation and planning of TREP, maximizing the benefits of a political situation that could be 
considered both within and outside of New Zealand. 
 
New Zealand aided TREP but from an economic point of view rather than to fight climate change 
and raise global awareness. New Zealand’s public recognition of motivation for the project mostly 
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revolved around economic issues in Tokelau and Empower Consultants (2008) acknowledge in their 
report that the unsustainability of expensive fossil fuel imports was a primary motivator for New 
Zealand (Empower Consultants, 2008). Foua Toloa did credit New Zealand and UNDP when 
dedicating the project, and other partners such as PowerSmart and IRENA. He said, “the world has 
learned and looked onto Tokelau as it takes an unprecedented step to become 100% renewable” 
(Toloa, 2012). 
 
4.4 International environmental politics 
The publicity and image derived from the project allowed Tokelau to overcome its lack of autonomy 
and remote location to achieve some influence on UN climate negotiations. Tokelau is acutely aware 
of its smallness and marginal position in global negotiations, compounded by its territorial status with 
New Zealand. “We stand to lose the most of any country in the world due to climate change and the 
rising sea levels,” Toloa stated at the Durban Climate Conference, “so leading the way by making the 
highest per person investment in the world is a message to the world to do something.” In dedication 
of TREP, Faipule Aliki Foua Toloa spoke of ridicule he received at Durban COP17 2011 on 
announcing the project as then Ulu o Tokelau, where it was said Tokelau’s were too insignificant for 
an investment of this size to be worthwhile: 
 
“We are here to convey the message that nowhere in all of these meetings, has Tokelau been able to have a voice 
in the policy development for adaptation and mitigation for climate change. We are part of that group of 
vulnerable nations most affected by climate change and yet do not have a presence within the formal discussions 
at the COP sessions and in the case of Tokelau, we are ineligible for Global Environment Facility funding” 
(Toloa, 2012). 
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Despite attending UNFCCC COP17 as part of New Zealand’s delegation, Tokelau came across as an 
independent country with a platform to announce the project with little mention of New Zealand’s 
role, and challenged the rest of the world to follow its renewable path. It also raised the issue of its 
vulnerability as a coral atoll and so positioned TREP with the threat of climate change in mind. 
Tokelau has not had a big presence at climate summits since Durban, sometimes sending a single 
delegate as part of the New Zealand delegation. However, at the 2014 UN SIDS conference in Apia, 
Tokelau’s leader represented the whole of New Zealand. The interaction of Tokelau with New 
Zealand at these arenas shows its limited autonomy, but also shows the flexibility given to its 
government by its status as a SNIJ. 
 
4.5 TREP as island innovation 
At the time of construction, the project was claimed to be the largest off grid system of its kind in the 
world. It was made of three distinct grids on each island. Many argued that high penetration of 
renewable energy was not practical for larger grids and would cause problems in the energy grid, but 
Tokelau was an instrumental force in showing the world that it could be done. The project was a form 
of policy innovation, using existing technology in a new way that demonstrated leadership across the 
Pacific region. 
 
The important roles of the New Zealand and Tokelauan Government have led to interesting questions 
about their motivations and respective involvements with the project. Tokelau’s current constitutional 
status means that it is inextricably linked to New Zealand for good and for worse, and even the GoT 
website uses a New Zealand domain name. Each party had similar but distinct motivations for entering 
into TREP. For Tokelau it was not only to reduce their expenses and improve island quality of life 
but to build global recognition of the threat faced by climate change. Although Tokelau’s contribution 
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to greenhouse gases is globally insignificant, the islands wanted to provide moral leadership and 
encourage action from emitters. By branding itself as the world’s first solar nation, Tokelau set an 
example to the world and gained moral high ground to argue for action on climate change. Again it 
benefited from its SNIJ status by identifying as a separate identity outside of New Zealand to maximize 
coverage of the project, while also using New Zealand funding and knowledge to help develop it. 
 
Tokelau’s branding of itself as a world leader in solar energy has been one of the few events that have 
given the islands worldwide recognition. A documentary titled “The Solar Nation of Tokelau” styles 
the islands’ story with solar as a David and Goliath tale in which the atolls are portrayed as weak and 
vulnerable and overcoming the challenge of becoming the world’s first 100% solar-powered nation 
and proving to the world that the unachievable ideal was truly possible. This even led to the 
development of an online game called Coconut Sunshine, where the player had to maximize the profits 
and use of solar panels on a small tropical island. 
 
The coverage of the project also led to some inaccuracies due to journalistic embellishment. The island 
was framed as the ‘world’s biggest off grid solar system’, although actually divided between the islands 
so it was actually three systems. The claim of 100% renewable energy generation is also arguable, as 
the islands still rely on diesel generation backup during cloudy periods. Although the initial idea was 
to provide this from coconut biofuel, it remains on fossil fuels due to technical complications of 
refining coconut oil. This framing for the press shows that media branding plays as important a role 
in innovation for climate change politics as the implementation of the technology itself. The 
inaccessibility of Tokelau allowed for the government to brand the project in its own way and, to some 
extent, dictate how the project would be covered by world media. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 
“This was their dream, that they had built, and we had merely brought it to them.” 
-Dean Parchomchuk of PowerSmart on TREP (TEDx Talks, 2013) 
 
This thesis explores how small island developing states (SIDS) have exerted agency through a changing 
global discourse on climate change, and argues that islands have used innovative practices to bring 
global attention and action to the environmental issues they face. The research links global 
environmental politics and island entrepreneurship and explores the interplay between these two 
central themes. The case study of the Tokelau Renewable Energy Project (TREP) is used to examine 
how island innovations around the development of a single project can have both local and 
international impacts that are formulated around climate change. This allows for broad insights on the 
intersection between innovation and environmental politics relevant to all SIDS, while noting the 
peculiarities that take shape in the Tokelauan context specifically. Every island group is different, and 
the Tokelau project has many factors unique to the geography, economics, and culture of the islands 
that resulted in this project being the first of its kind in the world. 
 
The research acknowledges there is no single definition of SIDS, and so uses a broad definition of 
SIDS to encompass sub-national island jurisdictions (SNIJs) of non-SIDS countries. The Tokelau 
story reveals specifically that as a SNIJ of New Zealand, it lacks the politically independent voice at 
the UN afforded to its neighbors such as Tuvalu, and is both hindered and empowered by its 
constitutional relationship with New Zealand. This concluding chapter analyzes the level to which the 
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original research goals were met regarding TREP and its wider applicability to global climate change 
politics, and provides suggestions for future research in the field.  
 
5.1 Methodology 
This thesis is a broad analysis of the role of the way SIDS and SNIJs have come to form an integral 
part of global discussions on climate change. It examines how the context of climate change has 
created space for these nations to explore and innovate new strategies to exert agency and find their 
place in the global environmental political-economic system through indigenously-driven innovative 
practices. This research also aims to understand the role of innovation in the Tokelau Renewable 
Energy Project, and thus the role of Tokelau’s sovereignty and colonial relationship with New 
Zealand. It tackles these questions with the following approaches: 
• documenting how Tokelau emerged at the forefront of renewable energy action in the Pacific 
region and the agency this developed. 
• documenting the local, national and international socio-economic processes that influenced 
the development of TREP. 
• examining the impact that renewable projects such as TREP can have on discourse 
domestically and internationally. 
• identifying the advantages and disadvantages that insularity poses to developing renewable 
energy projects such as TREP. 
 
These methods have some limitations due to the practical aspects of accessing the islands in their 
extremely remote locations. Although it was possible to talk to government officials based out of 
Samoa, those conversations occurred on an informal basis and could have benefitted from more 
structured interviews. Though thesis explores the local and global processes that impact 
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environmental politics and island innovation at large, these conclusions are unique to the islands of 
Tokelau and not always applicable to other SNIJs and SIDS. 
 
5.2 Islands as engines of innovation 
Islands are defined by geographic and social boundaries that separate them from their neighbors. They 
are often defined according to an associated mainland, an entity which itself could be an island off 
another mainland ad infinitum (Baldacchino, 2008). Islands can also exist in archipelagic hierarchies, 
each island having a unique relationship with the other. They can be mere fragments of local 
municipalities, provinces and regions, or entire countries. Islands are also not always the marginal 
entity, sometimes hosting capital cities and existing at the center of vast empires. 
 
This diversity does not mean islands lack commonalities. Isolation, fragmentation and small 
populations are all common features of insularity that can have a profound impact on cultural, society 
and the local political economy. Diseconomies of scale and high transaction costs due to 
transportation particularly affect the ability of many islands to interact with the wider capitalist system 
and engage in free trade. SIDS are a subcategory of islands that in particular exist on the margins of 
the neoliberal capitalist system and are thus forced to find ways to adapt and innovate in order to 
participate.  
 
These conditions create situations that drive innovation and entrepreneurship, as islanders look to 
how they can use their scarce resources and adapt to meet unique local conditions. For SNIJs, the 
greater the degree of island autonomy the greater the effective use of this mechanism for islanders to 
create new revenue streams. By differentiating themselves from associated mainlands or neighboring 
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jurisdictions, islands can find ways to compete despite their inherent lack of economic 
competitiveness. 
 
Policy innovation is one of the most heavily utilized forms of entrepreneurship by SNIJ governments. 
Through SNIJ status, islands can maximize their connections with their national government, while 
also taking advantage of their isolation and political autonomy. Through strategic navigation of these 
relationships, some SNIJs are able to position themselves ahead of geographically similar but 
independent polities, and exert political capital through this innovation. This is the case for Tokelau, 
where the government used its constitutional relationship with New Zealand to develop a project that 
had profound local benefits, while also sending a strong global political message that is rare for a SNIJ 
of that size.  
 
Responding to the threat of climate change has enabled islands to carve out a niche and gain a global 
platform to voice their concerns. Islands’ extreme vulnerability showcase the threats of climate change 
and they have been used to show the potential threats that many other regions could face in the future. 
Given islands marginal status in the field of global politics, it has taken significant skill and 
entrepreneurship by politicians and grassroots campaigners to become leaders, and have their voices 
heard over the larger and more powerful countries. 
 
As leaders in knowledge production on climate change adaptation and mitigation, SIDS have found 
new sources of investment and foreign aid to help lead sustainable development projects. The 
constraints of insularity have become an advantage in this field, enabling SIDS to position themselves 
in a unique way to attract funding. This paradox for atoll countries such as Tokelau, however, is that 
increase in their recognition is due to the possibility of future disappearance from rising sea levels. 
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5.3 Tokelau as a jurisdictional case study 
As an isolated and depopulated territory, Tokelau would not be expected to be a global leader in 
knowledge production and technological innovation for addressing climate change. The prevailing 
wisdom is that SIDS are non-competitive in entrepreneurship, yet the tiny nation became a global 
leader by generating almost all of its electricity with solar photovoltaic panels. Many unique aspects of 
Tokelau contribute to its leadership, including cultural norms, extremeness of its isolation, and its 
constitutional relationship with New Zealand. These distinctive factors mean that any conclusions 
drawn from Tokelau are difficult to apply to other jurisdictions where other variations to these 
conditions might exist. 
 
However, in many ways Tokelau exemplifies the features of insularity. It is extremely fragmented, with 
little transport between atolls and a government based in another country. It has a tiny population, 
and is one of the remotest inhabited groups of islands in the world. It also has a population that has 
consistently voted to retain its colonial relationship as a SNIJ, rather than pursue independence or free 
association. Moreover, as an atoll, it is extremely sensitive to changes in global climate. Consequently, 
Tokelau could be the perfect SNIJ for analysis as it is so far removed from its mainland economically, 
culturally and politically. Yet Tokelau is also inimitable in every respect, and so perhaps it is 
unsurprising that it led the world to excel in its own distinctively Tokelauan way. For TREP this was 
shown by the thoughtful and methodical implementation of the project, and its uniform execution 
nationwide to ensure all three atolls benefited equally from the installations. 
 
5.4 Contribution and further research 
This thesis aims to contribute to the literature on SNIJs and climate change politics in the South Pacific 
and beyond. Although there is much writing on the role of SIDS in global environmental politics, and 
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the force of moral leadership in their arguments, little has been said about the role of SNIJs such as 
Tokelau. These polities are affected differently to that of sovereign states, although many of their 
features do appear similar to SIDS. SNIJs gain both advantages and disadvantages from their 
associations with larger states, and this impacts their ability to interact in climate summits with global 
decision making on fossil fuel emissions.  
 
Further studies are needed to observe other examples of innovation in climate change adaptation and 
mitigation in both SIDS and SNIJs. For example, Kiribati was lauded on its purchase of land in Fiji 
for the relocation of its population in case of sea level rise, but this has not received much acclaim or 
attention from the academic community. Similarly, despite Tokelau’s leadership in the field, there has 
also been little coverage of the nation’s activities as compared to the other atoll nations, which are 
featured extensively. By linking island innovation to global climate politics, this thesis concludes that 
the interplay between the two is vital for securing the role of SIDS in the global economic-political 
order.
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Appendix A 
 
This is intended to be an incomplete list of polities that could be considered under the umbrella term 
of SIDS, alongside some of the SNIJs that could also be considered SIDS. 
  
 
 
Caribbean Pacific AIMS1 
SIDS represented independently at United Nations 
Antigua and Barbuda Federated States of Micronesia Bahrain5 
Bahamas Fiji Cape Verde 
Barbados Kiribati Comoros 
Belize2 Madagascar4 Cyprus5 
Cuba3 Marshall Islands Guinea-Bissau2 
Dominica Nauru Maldives 
Dominican Republic3 Palau Malta5 
Grenada Papua New Guinea Mauritius 
Guyana2 Samoa São Tomé and Príncipe 
Haiti3 Solomon Islands Seychelles 
Jamaica Timor-Leste Singapore6 
Saint Kitts and Nevis Tonga  
Saint Lucia Tuvalu  
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Vanuatu  
Suriname2   
Trinidad and Tobago   
SIDS not represented independently at United Nations7 
Anguilla American Samoa Ascension9 
Aruba Cook Islands8 Falkland Islands9 
Bermuda Easter Island Gibraltar9 
Bonaire French Polynesia Mayotte 
British Virgin Islands Guam Réunion 
Cayman Islands New Caledonia Saint Helena9 
Curaçao Niue8 Saint Pierre and Miquelon9 
French Guiana2 Northern Mariana Islands Tristan da Cunha9 
Guadeloupe Pitcairn Islands  
Martinique Tokelau  
Montserrat Wallis and Futuna  
Puerto Rico   
Saba   
Saint-Barthélemy   
Saint Martin   
Sint Eustatius   
Sint Maartin   
Turks and Caicos Islands   
United States Virgin Islands   
 64 
1 African, Indian Ocean, Mediterranean and South China Sea. An older acronym that is rarely relevant 
for modern definitions. This column also includes non-Caribbean Atlantic states for the purposes of 
this appendix. 
2 Non-island polities with strong geographic, cultural or historical ties to islands meaning that they are 
sometimes considered as SIDS. 
3 Cuba, Dominican Republic and Haiti have large populations over 10 million and sometimes not 
included as SIDS, although all are members of AOSIS. 
4 Madagascar has a population of 23 million and rarely included as a SIDS, but is a member of the 
Indian Ocean Commission. 
5 Bahrain, Cyprus and Malta were formerly considered SIDS but usually not included in contemporary 
definitions.  
6 Singapore, a member of AOSIS, has one of the world’s highest GDPs per capita. 
7 The list of SNIJs is less comprehensive as the number could increase exponentially according to 
the definition used. This list intends to be broad and used those SNIJs with the greatest level of 
autonomy, usually existing far away from their ‘mainland’.  
8 Niue and the Cook Islands are sovereign nations in free association with New Zealand but without 
full UN members. 
9 Overseas territories of France and United Kingdom included for completeness. These are not 
considered SIDS but with some similar characteristics to other SIDS. 
 
